Empirical research on the characteristics of environmentally responsive companies has focussed almost exclusively on US and Japanese firms. For Europe, which is commonly considered as the greenest of the three major developed economic markets, similar research is lacking. This paper seeks to fill this gap by empirically investigating the business and financial characteristics, stakeholder pressure and public policies distinguishing companies that have implemented the European Eco-Management and Audit System (EMAS) and those that have not using a unique firm-level dataset of European publicly quoted companies. The contribution of this paper is twofold. First of all, the decision to implement EMAS has not been widely analysed. Secondly, we focus on European firms which allows us to assess if and to what extent European firms behave like their US or Japanese counterparts. We find that the EMAS participation decision is positively influenced by the solvency ratio, the share of non-current liabilities and the average labour cost. Also, two measures of company size are positively associated with EMAS participation: both the absolute company size as well as the relative size of a company compared to its sector average. The profit margin on the other hand exerts a negative influence according to our results. We further show that public policy can heavily influence the EMAS participation decision: companies whose headquarters is located in a member state that actively encourages EMAS have a higher probability of participation.
INTRODUCTION
In response to increasing stakeholder pressure, companies are embracing the "corporate social responsibility" concept evermore tightly. Social, environmental and sustainability reports are being published at an considered as the standard of environmental excellence and is more stringent and demanding than ISO 14001 (e.g. Kollman and Prakash, 2002; Watson and Emery, 2004 (Nakamura et al., 2001; Hibiky et al., 2003; Potoski and Prakash 2005) or on the comprehensiveness of environmental management practices implemented (Dasgupta et al., 2000; Khanna and Anton, 2002; Anton et al., 2004; Cole et al., 2006) . As EMAS is perceived as being more demanding than ISO 14001, it may present a better picture of environmental responsiveness. Next to explaining the adoption of an EMS, a number of studies have focussed on the participation decision towards several US EPA's voluntary programmes such as the 33/50 program Cason, 1995 and Khanna and Damon, 1999; Videras and Alberini, 2000) , Green Lights (DeCanio and Watkins, 1998; Videras and Alberini, 2000) and Waste Wi$e (Videras and Alberini, 2000) . King and Lenox (2000) studied companies' participation decision in the Chemical Industry's Responsible Care Program. Finally, Henriques and Sadorsky (1996) examined the motivations explaining firms' formulation of an environmental plan.
Second, this is the first study on the characteristics of green companies that uses a European firm-level dataset. Previous research has focused principally on US companies Cason, 1995 and DeCanio and Watkins, 1998; Khanna and Damon, 1999; King and Lenox, 2000; Videras and Alberini, 2000; Khanna and Anton, 2002; Anton et al., 2004; Potoski and Prakash, 2005) . Studies on ISO 14001 are mainly based on a sample of Japanese companies (Nakamura et al., 2001; Hibiky et al., 2003; Potoski and Prakash, 2005; Cole et al., 2006) . Henriques and Sadorsky (1996) took a sample of Canadian companies and Mexican companies were the subjects of the study of Dasgupta et al. (2000) . The number of participants in the total sample (8,7%) is low, but in line with some previous research (e.g. Arora and Cason, 1996; King and Lenox, 2000; Potoski and Prakash, 2005 This was done due to our doubts on the accuracy of these data. 53 companies were lost. 4 The EMAS helpdesk lists all organisations at facility level. Our sample however consists of companies at group level. As such following Nakamura et al. (2001) and Hibiki et al. (2003) , an organisation was marked as EMAS participant if at least one of its facilities was registered.
both standards. In June 1998, close to half of the companies that were EMAS-registered also held an ISO 14001 certificate, while another third intended to go for ISO 14001 certification (Hillary, 1998) 
where Λ is either the cumulative logistic function (logit model) or normal distribution function (probit model), β is a vector of parameters to be estimated and x are the characteristics of the firm influencing the costs and benefits of EMAS and hence, the decision to implement it.
DETERMINANTS OF ENVIRONMENTALLY RESPONSIVE COMPANIES
In this section we outline our main hypotheses and define the related independent variables. The European scope of the sample limits the independent variables we were able to include and thus the hypotheses to be tested. Next to Amadeus, the availability of comparable company-level data in Europe is limited. As such, although it would be interesting to test hypotheses on export ratio, R&D, advertising intensity… data limitations imply this is beyond the scope of this paper. Next the almost non-existence of comparable firm-level environmental performance data in Europe hinders testing whether EMAS participants prove superior environmental performance. Furthermore the fact a number of countries are included in the sample limits the variables to be included due to comparability problems with data from national sources.
We found inspiration for the majority of our independent variables in the literature. In a perfect world one would take the data from year(s) preceding a company's registration to EMAS. However, this might also create a bias as the implementation time is likely to differ between companies and some variables might be influenced by business cycle fluctuations. Therefore, for most financial variables that were taken from a company's balance sheet or profit and loss statement, we used averages over a 7-year period.
Business characteristics
Companies with a high number of facilities will face more difficulties in by Arora and Cason (1996) and Dasgupta et al. (2000) .
It is commonly hypothesised that size of a company positively influences the participation decision. Possible explanations include the following. First larger companies are more visible and face greater scrutiny from various stakeholders (Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996; Videras and Alberini, 2000; Cole et al., 2006) . However, since all the firms in this analysis are publicly quoted and face scrutiny in the financial press, this reason might not be as important in our analysis. Second the key role of management is to ensure coordination of all actions of the many individuals and subgroups in the organisation. Larger companies face higher coordination costs, as there are more people and activities to coordinate. As such the need for formal structures and procedures to ensure that all employees are focussing their efforts towards the goals set by the management rises (Henriques and Sadorky, 1996) . An EMS might serve as an instrument to reduce these coordination costs. Third large companies presumably have more financial and intellectual resources and experience with management standards like ISO 9001 (Nakamura et al., 2001; Hibiki et al., 2003; Cole et al., 2006) .
Here, we measure company size in 2 different ways. First, we use the average number of employees in the period 1998-2004 (EMPLOYEES).
Secondly, we also created an additional size-variable (RELATIVE SIZE)
that grasps the relative size of a company compared to the sector average.
To do this we divided the number of employees of a specific company by the average number of all employees in all companies in the same 4 digit NACE category in the sample. As such this variable compares the size of the company to that of its sector-competitors.
Next we hypothesise that the higher the average labour costs of a company, the more likely it is to have implemented EMAS. Higher average labour costs might represent a higher educated workforce or might refer to rather unsafe working conditions (e.g. higher wages in the nuclear or chemical sector). If higher educated people have a higher environmental awareness, as well the educated workforce as the unsafe working conditions explanation imply higher incentives to exert pressure on top management for safe working conditions and pollution abatement efforts. Moreover a highly skilled workforce will make it easier to implement a complex management system as they are generally more trainable, adaptable, and less resistant to change. We took the average costs of employees and averaged it over the years 1998-2004 to remove business cycle fluctuations.
We will denote this variable with "LABOUR COST".
A measure for capital intensity was included under the premise that capital-intensive companies have more complex production technologies; require more energy and raw materials input and hence have higher emission levels (Cole et al., 2006) . This induces the need for mechanisms to control these complex and highly polluting processes and in turn provides greater opportunities and scope for the introduction of clean technologies.
The variable (CAPITAL INTENSITY) is measured by the ratio fixed assets per employee. Again the average over the years 1998-2004 is taken.
Finally, industry sector dummies are included to take into account industry-specific characteristics (e.g. Henriques and Sadorsky, 1996; Videras and Alberini, 2000; Hibiki et al., 2003) . As such industry-wide differences with respect to, for instance, pollution intensity, regulatory burden and public concern are controlled for. Also, it controls for the differences with respect to the possibility to implement EMAS. As already noted, some firms were only able to implement it after the revision in 2001.
A company's activity was grouped based on the NACE classification Revision 1.1 and grouped into five industry dummies (SECTOR) shown in table 1. In our empirical test, the mining and quarrying, manufacturing and construction sector (sector A) is the omitted dummy. 
Financial characteristics
Implementing an EMS can be considered as a voluntary investment in an intangible asset, which is more likely to occur in companies with a sound financial structure (Videras and Alberini, 2000) . It should be noted that the primal objective of an EMS is not to increase short-term profits. In fact, the opposite might be the case. The costs are immediate but the benefits are uncertain and might only materialise in the long run.
First we include the profit margin as a measure for a company's profitability. More profitable companies are supposed to have easy access to the funds, by retained profits or capital markets (Nakamura et al., 2001 ).
The variable (PROFITABILITY) is measured by the average profit margin, defined as profit before taxation on turnover, over the period 1998-2004.
Second we include the solvency ratio (SOLVENCY) and expect a positive sign. The solvency ratio is calculated as shareholders funds on total assets and we use averages over 1998-2004.
Stakeholders and public policy
Within the wide range of stakeholders, shareholders and creditors may be important groups requesting the company to adopt a certified EMS. Both may require an EMS as a guarantee of good management in general and environmental risk minimization in particular to safeguard their invested funds. We hypothesize that the higher the number of shareholders the more pressure they will exert. Small shareholders have less influence on and knowledge about the company's operations and strategy compared to major shareholders. As a result they have more interest in external verification of good management to minimize the risk of future environmental liability.
The variable (SHAREHOLDERS) reports the number of shareholders in
2004. A shareholder is reported if he holds at least 1% of the shares.
The pressure that emanates from creditors is measured by the average of the ratio of the non-current liabilities on total assets over the period 1998-
(NON-CURRENT LIABILITIES). The higher their share in the way
the company is financed, the higher their associated risks. The variable only reflects the interests of long-term creditors, as we believe short-term creditors do not have an incentive to push the company's policy towards long-term objectives.
Finally, we include the country in which the company's headquarters is located. EMAS participation rates differ significantly form country to country. The national government's policy is supposed to play pivotal role in this regard by e.g. facilitating access to information, granting support funds, shaping attractive public procurement guidelines (e.g. Perkins and Neumayer, 2004; Delmas, 2002; Kollman and Prakash, 2002 However it should be noted that in binary regressand models the goodness of fit is of secondary importance. The sign of the coefficients and their significance is what matters (Gujarati, 2003) . ) is 1.009. Then we may say that when the independent variable increases one unit, the odds that the dependent equals 1 increase by a factor of 1.009, when other variables are controlled for. The closer the odds ratio is to 1, the less influence the independent variable exerts on the dependent variable. Equally one can say that when the variable employees increase by one unit (1000 employees) the odds of being EMAS registered increases by 0.9%. The third column shows the percent increase in the probability of being certified for a one-unit increase in the independent variable, controlling for the other variables in the model. 0.3214 * , ** and *** indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively Note. Probability values are shown in parentheses. LR statistic is a chi-square test for all slope coefficients jointly equal to zero.
Next we turn to the significance of the variables. The number of shareholders, the number of facilities, the capital intensity 5 and one sector dummy are not significant. The insignificance of the number of facilities corresponds with Arora and Cason (1996) but contradicts with Dasgupta et al. (2000) who found that being a multi-plant company was the most influential variable. Whereas the theoretical arguments for the capital intensity variable were appealing, our unexpected result is also found by Cole et al. (2006) . In their paper, for some measures of a company's environmental awareness it even turned out significantly negative. Note however that three sector dummy variables are significant. These dummies may partly capture differences in capital intensiveness among companies.
Compared to the mining and quarrying, manufacturing and construction sector (sector A), companies involved in electricity, gas or water supply The size of a company, measured by the number of employees, is significant at the 5% level. Controlling for the absolute number of employees, the relative size of a company compared to its sector average turns out positive and significant at 1% 6 . These results confirm the expectation that larger companies are more likely to have implemented EMAS even when controlling for the number of facilities. From the odds ratio's, it follows that relative size has the most important influence on the probability of EMAS implementation. Hence, within a given sector and controlling for absolute size, we find that especially larger firms implement EMAS.
Labour cost's influence on the probability of EMAS implementation is positive and highly significant. This implies that companies with highly skilled workforce of with unsafe working conditions have a higher probability of having implemented EMAS. This corresponds to some extent with Dasgupta et al.'s (2000) finding that companies in which a higher proportion of employees followed postsecondary education have significantly more comprehensive EMS.
When looking at the financial variables, it turns out that the profitability measure is significant at the 10% level, but has a negative coefficient. In the probit model, this variable is also negative but no longer significant. Using alternative measures of profitability such as the return on shareholder funds or the return on total assets did not alter this result: these alternative variables turned out negative but insignificant. differentiate from competitors is higher in more competitive markets where profit margins are generally rather moderate.
The coefficient of the solvency ratio is positive and significant.
Furthermore, the higher the share of non-current liabilities the higher the probability a company is EMAS registered. Both confirm that a solid financial structure on the long term is favourable for implementing EMAS. A database on firm level CO 2 -emissions created in the wake of the recent emission-trading directive on greenhouse gas emissions might provide us with a promising indicator in this regard. 
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